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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
INSURANCE-SINGLE OR MULTIPLE ACCIDENTS
The plaintiff's truck collided with a train and derailed sixteen cars
belonging to fourteen separate owners. The plaintiff was covered by an
automobile property damage liability policy which provided for a maximum
payment of $5,000 for each accident. In a suit by the plaintiff against
his insurer the issue was whether the collision and subsequent derailing
of each of the sixteen cars were one accident or several. Held, the collision
and the derailing of the cars were one accident, and, therefore, total
recovery could not exceed $5,000. Saint Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co. v.
Rutland, 225 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1955).
Interpretations by the courts of the property damage clause in the
conventional comprehensive automobile policy have displayed a lack of
unanimity both in result and in understanding of the basic problem
which has frequently been justified because of the paucity of decisions.
However, sufficient cases involving this question have arisen to indicate
that certain principles do exist. The instant case displays an awareness
of these principles.
In one jurisdiction the time element was a deciding factor.' A
building collapsed due to excavation under adjoining property and two
days later the building on the other side of the excavated property col-
lapsed, no new excavating having taken place in the interim. The insurer
contended that the collapses were one accident since they were due
to the same cause. The court held that there were two separate accidents
and the insurer was liable for each of the accidents; the time element of
two days being the controlling factor.
In another case2 several panes of glass broke simultaneously from one
cause. Total damage was $425.00. The policy had a $50.00 deductible
provision for each "claim." The insurer contended that the breaking of
each pane was a separate claim, and since no one pane was worth more
than $50.00, there was no liability. The court distinguished between
"claim" and "each item that makes up a claim" and held that windows
broken (from the same cause) were items of a claim. The court further
held that the word "claim" in the policy was susceptible of two definitions
and, therefore, ambiguous; the court then followed the general principle
that ambiguities in an insurance policy are to be construed against the
writerI
1. Kuhn's of Brownsville v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 270 S.W.2d 358 (Tcnn. 1954).
2. llacrens v. Commercial Cas, Ins. Co., 279 P.2d 211 (Calif. 1955).
3. Western & Southern Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Commission, 366 I11. 240,
8 N.E.2d 644 (1937)(The phrase "elsewhere in Illinois" was held ambiguous and
construed against the insurer); Swanson v. Georgia Casualty Co., 315 Mo. 1007, 287
S.V. 455 (1926); Updike Inv. Co. v. Employers Liability Assur. Corp., Ltd., of
London, England, 131 Neb. 745, 750, 270 NANV. 107, 110 (1936)(The court stated:
"The word 'accident' has many meanings and . . .. unless otherwise stipulated, it
CASENOTES
Other jurisdictions proceed on the theory of proximate cause. It is
generally agreed (with reference to proximate cause), that where there
are successive causes, each of which is independently sufficient to produce
the loss insured against, the cause last operating is the proximate one.
4
\Vhere there are two or more concurrent causes of loss, the predominating
effective one, or the one which sets the others in motion and gives them
the power to harm is the proximate cause. '  An unusual fact situation
occurred in Anchor Casualty Co. v. McCaleb" where an oil well (un-
controllable for over 50 hours) damaged the properties of several persons.
The insurer attempted to limit overall liability to the policy maximum for
one accident. However, the wind, every time it changed, was deemed to
be a supervenng force which was said to have caused a different accident.
Judge Holmes termed this a "series of events resulting in numerous
accidents."
In the principle case, the majority opinion differentiatcd the Anchor
case7 as a series of events and not a single, sudden collision (as was the
instant case). They considered the cause of the accident rather than
the result and substantiated this by construing the phrasing of the policy
("caused" by accident). Further they considered the liability in relation
to cvents rather than claimants, thus limiting the policy. They felt a
should be given the construction most favorable to the insured." Here it was held
to include exposure to cold drafts of air.); Carolina Veneer & Lumber Co. v. American
Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 202 S.C. 103, 24 S.E.2d 153 (1943)(The term "legally
employed" meant not if a contract of employment existed, but if a legal contract of
employment could be made.); Issacson Iron Works v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee
Corp., 191 Wash. 221, 70 P.2d 1026 (1937).
4. See Howard Fire Insurance Co. v. Norwich & N.Y. Trans. Co., 79 U.S.
(12 Wall.) 194, 199 (1871)("When one of several successive causes is sufficient
to produce the effect . . . the law will never regard an antecedent cause of that cause,
or the 'causa causans'." Where fire and collision had destroyed a ship, the court
found the damages severable and did not have to apply this rule.); Denham v. LaSalle-
Madison Hotel Co., 168 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1948). (A hotel had a liability policy
with $10,000 limit for loss of guests' property in "one occurrence or catastrophe."
Within a space of 17 hours, property was damaged by fire and the resultant smoke,
water and theft. The fire was found to be the proximate cause of the various
injuries, and therefore the injuries resulting from smoke, water and theft were not"subsequent losses."); Princess Garment Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 115 F.2d
380 (6th Cir. 1940) (Plaintiffs removing property from the premises during a flood
were stopped by authorities due to a fire. The rising waters subsequently damaged
the property but the fire never reached the building. The court reasoned the fire
was the proximate cause of the loss, since but for the fire, the loss would not have
occurred).
5. Accord. Lanasa Fruit S.S. and Importing Co. v. Universal Ins. Co., 302 U.S.
556. 562 (1938)("The proximate cause is the efficient cause and not a merely
incidental cause which may be nearer in time to the result."); Aetna Fire Ins. Co. v.
Boon, 95 U.S. 117, 130 (1877)("'In case of the concurrence of different causes, to
one of which it is necessary to attribute the loss, it is to be attributed to the
predominating peril, whether it is or is not in activity at the consummation of the
disaster.' "); Howard Fire ins. Co. v. Norwich & N.Y. Trans. Co., supra note 4 at 199
("But when there is no order of succession in time, when there are two concurrent
causes of a loss, the predominating efficient one must be regarded as the proximate.
when the damage done by each cannot be distinguished."): Hartford Steam Boiler
Inspection and Ins. Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 201 Fed. 617 (7th Cir. 1912).
6. 178 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1949).
7. Ibid.
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policy without limitation would destroy the intention of the parties and
afford no basis for computation of premium rates, since the risk involved
would be unknown.
The dissent felt that the principles of the Anchor case were applicable.,
Agreeing that a basic test is whether the accident is to be interpreted
"from the standpoint of the cause or the result of the accident," the
minority thought the result controlled.
Generally, words in an insurance policy are construed with reference
to the ordinary understanding, common usage and speech of people.10
It follows then that an assembled train takes on an identity separate and
apart from the railroad cars of which it consists. Thus, a collision between
a truck and a train would be one accident, although many might suffer
damages.
The decision achieves a sound result, in that the scope of the liability
is not extended to an area not contemplated by the insured and insurer
at the time of making the original contract."-
The case appears to be the first to recognize that in defining "one
accident" only two points of view are possible, that of causation or that
of result. Its choice of the former seems a most happy conclusion.
TALA ENGen
8. But the court applies the rule of the Anchor case too far. They would hold
the insurer liable for $58,000 on a policy written on a premium rate based on $5,000.
9. This reasoning has been used to interpret the word "accident" and would
be applicable to substantiate the decisions of both factions. To the same effect see:
Hyer v. Inter-Insurance Exchange, 77 Cal. App. 343, 246 Pac. 1055 (1926) (Insured's
car struck another, breaking the steering gear. This caused it to run into a third
car. The court held there was one negligent act with one sole proximate cause and,
therefore, one accident with several resultant injuries.); Lewis v. Commercial Cas. Inv.
Co., 142 Md. 472, 121 Atl. 259 (1923); Tuttle v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 121
Mont. 58, 190 Pac. 993 (1920): contra, Berger Bros. Electric Motors v. New Amsterdam
Gas. Co., 46 N.Y.S.2d 64, 267 App. Div. 333, aff'd, 293 N.Y. 523, 58 N.E.2d 717
(1944) (Injuries are accidental or not, for the purpose of indemnity, according to the
quality of the results rather than the quality of the causes).
10. United States Mut. Ace. Ass'n v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100 (1889); Hyer v.
Inter-Insurance Exchange, supra note 9; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 165 Ind.
317, 75 N.E. 262 (1905); Lickleider v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 184 Iowa
423, 166 N.W. 363 (1918).
A definition of "accident" is given by Black as "an event which under the
circumstances is unusual and unexpected by the person to whom it happens." BLACK,
LAw DICTIONARY p. 30 (4th ed. 1951).
Ohio Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sparks, 57 Ga. App. 830, 196 S.E. 915
(1938) ("Collision" may include any impact of one body with another, but must be
construed in accordance with what parties must reasonably have contemplated as to
coverage) .
11. An interesting analogy is found in Hyer v. Inter-Insurance Exchange, etc.,
su/ra note 9 at 1058 ("If it be proper to say that there is but one 'occurrence' where
two persons are injured in an automobile collision, then it is a mistake to say of
such a case that there are two 'accidents'; for in a general sense every automobile
accident is an occurrence.").
See also, Williams v. Standard Ace. Ins. Co., 188 F.2d 206, (5th Cit. 1951)
(Under an automobile liability policy limiting liability for bodily injury to $5,000 for
"each person," the term "each person" referred to the person injured or killed and
not to each person who might be damaged as a result of bodily injury inflicted upon
or death suffered by one person).
